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Abstract 
 
 
This paper uses the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) as a natural experiment to evaluate the job 
mobility response of prime aged US employees participating into employer sponsored defined 
benefit (DB) pension plans to a reduction in the vesting period for pension rights accrual. The 
repeated panel data design of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) allows us to 
implement a "difference-in-difference" identification strategy using data from pre and post-reform 
periods. The effect of the policy change is identified as the difference between the change in 
predicted voluntary job mobility of the treated group and the change in predicted voluntary job 
mobility of the control group, over the period under study. We find that the reform had no 
significant effects on voluntary job mobility of the treated group. Our findings are robust to the 
use of different control groups and different pre/post reform samples. 
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1 Introduction
Federal policy toward portability of pension rights has been seen as an important issue
since the 1960s in the United States. Approximately 40 percent of pension plans had
no vesting provisions before the Employees Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
of 1974 established minimum vesting standards. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 further
reduced the maximum vesting period from 10 to 5 years of plan participation.
Following the policy debate, driven by e¢ciency and equity issues, much of the em-
pirical investigation has focused on the likely e¤ects of enhanced pension portability
on retirement income and on employee productivity. Simulation studies1 have shown
that, despite shorter vesting periods, benet losses when changing jobs can still be sig-
nicant for workers participating to dened benet (DB) plans. Alternatively, while a
number of empirical studies have found that participation in employer sponsored pen-
sion plans is associated with less frequent quits and layo¤s2, there is disagreement over
whether reduced job mobility arising from nonportable pensions enhances or reduces
the e¢ciency of labor markets3.
Although policy reforms reducing the length of the vesting period have been enacted
in most industrialized countries with wide employer provided pension coverage4 no
1See Clark and McDermed (1988), Employee Benets Research Institute (1987).
2Mitchell (1983), Gustman and Steinmeier (1993), Allen, Clark and McDermed (1988, 1993), An-
drietti and Hildebrand (2001).
3See Dorsey (1995) for a review of the literature.
4See Andrietti (2002) for a review of the reforms implemented in the United States, Canada, Ireland,
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.
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empirical study has been produced to evaluate the impact of these policies.
In this paper we examine the impact of a reduction in the vesting period, introduced
by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86), on voluntary job mobility of US private sector
prime aged employees. Given the typical structure of US employer provided pension
plans, the reform a¤ected workers participating in a DB plan with 5 to 10 accrued years
of service, but is predicted to have no e¤ect on another group - workers with 5 to 10
years of tenure but not participating in a DB plan. The latter group includes workers
participating in an employer provided dened contribution (DC) plan as well as workers
not participating to any employer provided pension arrangement. In order to identify
the e¤ect of the reform we adopt a di¤erence-in-di¤erence strategy, comparing the
pre-post reform change in voluntary job mobility for workers treated by the reform with
that of workers with similar characteristics but not a¤ected by the reform and therefore
taken as the control group.
We nd that the reform had a not statistically signicant e¤ect on voluntary job
mobility of the treated group. Our ndings are robust to the use of di¤erent control
groups and pre-post reform samples.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes employer provided pensions in
the US and the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Section 3 illustrates the identication strategy.
Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents the results. We conclude in section 6.
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2 Employer Provided Plans, Vesting Provisions and the 1986
Tax Reform Act
Employer provided pension plans typically fall within one of two broad categories:
dened benet (DB) and dened contribution (DC) plans. In a traditional DB plan,
each employees future benet is determined by a specic formula, and the plan provides
a nominal level of benets upon retirement. The typical nal pay formula relates
pension benets to the length of service and to the nal salary received, with the
pension promise being usually funded through employers contributions. DC plans
provide for periodic contributions into an individual pension account for each worker.
The contributions may be made by the rm and/or the worker. The level of benet
at retirement is determined by the total amount of contributions made and the rate
of return of each individuals retirement assets. Although di¤erent types of DC plans5
are o¤ered in the US, most of them have the so called 401(k) option which allows
participant employees to make pre-tax contributions6. In principle, employers could
establish 401(k) plans that rely entirely on voluntary employee contributions. However,
they usually o¤er matching contributions up to a limit.
Individuals enrolled in pension plans, either of the DB or DC type, are subject to a
vesting period before being fully entitled to their pension rights. Once vested, a worker
5Money purchase plans, saving and thrift plans, prot sharing plans, stock bonus plans and employee
stock ownership plans.
6401(k) plans are also referred to as salary reduction plans, as participating workers take-home pay
is reduced to make contributions to the plan.
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can quit his/her job and retain the legal right to the future pension benet he/she has
been contributing for.
Prior to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, there
were no required vesting standards. ERISA established three primary vesting rules,
contingent on the minimum plan participation standards which initially allowed plans to
exclude workers under age 25, those working fewer than 1.000 hours annually and those
within 5 years of normal retirement age (not to exceed age 65)7. Under cli¤ vesting
participants were granted full (100-percent) rights to all accumulated benets only
after completing 10 years of plan participation. Under graded vesting the employee
had to be at least 25-percent vested in the plans accrued benets after 5 years of
plan participation, with increases in this percentage phased in over the next 5 years
of service and reaching 100-percent vesting after 15 years. Finally, under the third
vesting standard, called as the rule of 45, an employee with 5 or more years of plan
participation had to be at least 50-percent vested when the sum of the employees
age and the employees years of plan participation reached 45, with increases of the
nonforfeitable pension rights percentage under a xed schedule. ERISA also stipulated
shorter vesting schedules for the so called class year plans, dened as prot sharing,
stock bonus, or money purchase plans providing for an employees rights to contributions
for each plan year separately. In this case, the plan had to ensure a 5-years vesting
7Employee Benet Research Institute (1986).
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schedule for such employer contributions, with 100-percent vesting not later than the
end of the fth plan year after the contributions were made. Of course, plans could
allow participants to vest more quickly than the minimum standards set by law.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86) introduced shorter vesting schedules and
reduced the vesting options available to employers. Private single employer plans were
allowed to provide either cli¤ vesting after 5 years of service or graded vesting of 20
percent after 3 years of service and 20 percent for each subsequent year of service, with
full vesting reached after 7 years of service. The class vesting schedule was eliminated.
The changes became e¤ective for plan years beginning January 1st, 1989.
Graham (1988) uses data from the 1986 Employee Benet Survey, administered to
medium and large private sector rms, to show the inuence of ERISA on vesting
schedules. According to the survey, the vast majority of individuals participating in
DB plans were subject to a 10 years cli¤ vesting schedule, while only 13 percent were
subject to graded vesting schedules and overall only 10 percent of participants were
o¤ered vesting schedules more liberal than those prescribed by ERISA.
Alternatively, more than one quarter of DC plan participants were given immediate
full vesting, while a minority of DC plan participants were o¤ered cli¤ vesting within 5
years. Finally, most graduated and class vesting schedules were providing full vesting
after 5 years of service.
The 1986 Employee Benets Survey indicates that the vesting schedules of nearly
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all DB plans needed to be modied to comply with the standards introduced by the
TRA86, while most DC plans were already providing much more liberal vesting sched-
ules than those prescribed by ERISA and therefore were already complying with the
new legislation. Currently, most DC plans allow for the immediate vesting of employee
contributions, while virtually all DB plans impose ve years vesting8.
3 Identication Strategy
The evidence reported in the previous section suggests that the vesting reform intro-
duced by the TRA86 worked as a natural experiment, a¤ecting almost exclusively
workers enrolled in DB plans with 5 to 10 years of service. A natural experiment occurs
when some exogenous event - like a change in government policy - changes the envi-
ronment in which agents operate. A natural experiment always has a control group,
which is not a¤ected by the policy change, and a treatment group, which is thought
to be a¤ected by the policy change. Unlike true experiments, where treatment and
control groups are randomly and explicitly chosen, control and treatment groups in nat-
ural experiments arise from the particular policy change. The policy change provides
a transparent exogenous source of variation in the explanatory variables determining
assignment to treatment.
In order to control for systematic di¤erences between the control and treatment
groups at least two years of data are needed: one before and one after the policy
8See Woods (1993).
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change. The sample is then broken down into four groups: the control group before
the change, the control group after the change, the treatment group before the change,
and the treatment group after the change.
The reason why a control group is required is that there might be other changes in
the economy a¤ecting the treatment groups outcome other then the policy intervention.
If a control group is available which is a¤ected by these other changes in the economy
in the same way as the treated group, then it is possible to identify the impact of the
policy. This is done through a "di¤erence-in-di¤erence" approach, which estimates the
excess outcome growth of the treated group relative to a well suited control group.
In our setting, the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator is implemented through a sim-
ple comparison of the di¤erence in voluntary job mobility rates of workers enrolled in
employer provided DB pension plans with 5 to 10 years of service, which were a¤ected
by the policy reform (the treatment group), with the same di¤erence for workers with
similar service but not participating in a DB plan (the control group). Our dependent
variable - voluntary job mobility- is dichotomous. This requires a distributional as-
sumption on the unobservables to restrict the probability of observed outcomes in the
zero-one range. However, to illustrate the di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach we consider
for simplicity a linear probability model.
We dene a dummy variable  which equals one if individual  is in the treatment
group, and zero otherwise. We also dene a dummy variable  if individual 
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is observed after the policy reform, as well as an interaction term among these two
dummies. The equation of interest is
 = 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 ¢ + _ (1)
where  is the outcome variable of interest - a dummy equal to one if a worker
experienced a voluntary job to job transition - and 3 - the interaction term coe¢cient
- measures the e¤ect of the policy. Without other factors in the regression, ^3 will be
the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimator9:
^3 = (¹ ¡ ¹)¡ (¹ ¡ ¹) (2)
where the bar denotes group average, the rst subscript denotes the treatment/control
group, and the second subscript denotes the pre/post reform period.
However, the observed di¤erences in job mobility rates may reect underlying di¤er-
ences between the treatment and control groups rather than a treatment e¤ect. Control-
ling for individual and job specic characteristics in a di¤erence-in-di¤erence framework
is important if the composition of the treatment or control group changes over time and
some of the characteristics are correlated with the dependent variable. When explana-
tory variables are added to equation (1) the OLS estimate of 3 no longer has the simple
form of (2)  but its interpretation is similar.
Given the dichotomous nature of our dependent variable , we assume that the
9We could obtain the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimate regressing the outcome dummy on the reform
dummy separately for the treatment/control groups and subtracting the control estimated coe¢cients
from the treated one.
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equation errors are normally distributed and estimate probit regressions of the following
form:
 () = ©0 + 1 + 2 + 3 ¢ + ) (3)
where © (¢) is the cumulative normal distribution. The variables included in the vector
 control for observable di¤erences in characteristics of the treatment and control
groups that a¤ect the voluntary job mobility rate. Common unobservable di¤erences
among groups are controlled for by the variable  while  controls for common
macro e¤ects.
A test of the impact of TRA86 is a test that workers participating in an employer
sponsored DB pension plan with job tenure between 5 and 10 years increased their job
mobility after the passage of the reform relative to workers with a similar job tenure in
the control group. It is a test that 3 is greater than zero. Thus our hypothesis tests
are one-tailed.
There are a number of potential problems to be addressed while using the di¤erence-
in-di¤erence approach. Finding a suitable control group can be di¢cult. It is required
that the control group be una¤ected by the policy itself while being a¤ected by other
(macro) economic factors in the same way as the treatment group. Moreover, treat-
ment and control group have to be comparable. This latter aspect is important for
three main reasons10. First, the D-D estimator relies on the similarity of the control
10See Meyer (1995).
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and treatment groups in order to separate the e¤ect of interest from other exogenous
inuences. The key assumption, which is likely to hold only if the groups are compa-
rable, is that the e¤ect of these exogenous inuences is the same on the control and
treatment groups. Second, the more di¤erent the control and experimental groups are,
the higher is the bias from hidden interactions. For example, an estimate of the e¤ect of
the reform the includes in the control group only (or also) individuals not participating
in any employer provided pension arrangement, may be biased if individuals in em-
ployer provided pension plans are less likely to leave their jobs because they hold good
jobs. Third, since the true model equation is unknown, there is a risk of misspecifying
the form of the estimating equation. For example, if the true equation is in levels, a
transformation to a nonlinear (probit) form will result in misspecication bias. This
bias may be exacerbated if the control group and the treatment group are dissimilar in
the mean or distribution of the dependent variable.
To estimate the e¤ect of the vesting reform it is then essential to nd two groups that
are comparable, one of which is a¤ected by the reform. The di¤erence-in-di¤erence ap-
proach requires the assignment into the treatment and the control groups to be random,
and therefore not related to the outcome under study. With nonrandom assignment,
di¤erences in labour market outcomes may reect the noncomparability of the two
groups rather the e¤ect of the vesting reform. To prevent this possibility, we esti-
mate regressions in which the relevant demographic, job related and local labor market
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characteristics are controlled for. With this adjustment we need a weaker assumption:
conditional on observable characteristics, allocation into the treatment and the control
group is random. In our case, comparing the voluntary job mobility rate of DB partic-
ipants with that of no-DB participants may bias the results if a nonrandom group of
individuals participate into employer provided DB pension arrangements. In particu-
lar, DB plan participants are likely to di¤er from non-participants both in observable
and unobservable characteristics. There is widespread evidence that participants in DB
plans have higher wages and higher education. Also, DB participants are likely to have
lower discount rates, thus preferring tax deferred compensation to cash wages while at
the same time being intrinsically less mobile. Alternatively, employers can use pension
plans to screen out movers11. However, alternative control groups can be workers not
participating to a DB plan as well as workers participating only to a DC plan. The
latter group in particular should be pretty similar to the group of DB participants, in
both observable and unobservable characteristics.
In order to assess the robustness of our estimates, we use multiple control groups in
the empirical analysis. The advantage of having multiple control groups is that if we
nd similar results, we can be more condent that we are estimating the actual e¤ect
of the vesting reform and not just the e¤ect of other contemporaneous changes or trend
di¤erences between the control and treatment groups. Ultimately, then, the credibility
11See Ippolito (1997).
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of our results lies in the consistency of our estimates across di¤erent treatment and
control groups rather than on any one estimate.
4 Data
Our source of data is the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The SIPP
is a set of independent overlapping short panels12. The adults followed in each SIPP
panel come from a nationally representative sample of individuals 15 years of age and
older to be selected in households in the civilian non-institutionalized US population.
Those individuals, along with others who subsequently live with them, are interviewed
once every four months over the life of the panel. Each panel is randomly divided into
four rotation groups. Each rotation group is interviewed in a separate month and the
four rotation groups constitute a wave. In each year of the panel data are collected for
a varying number of waves, covering up to 48 months.
Information collected in SIPP falls into two categories: core and topical. The core
questionnaire is administered at every interview and covers demographic and economic
characteristics of each household member. Most core questions provide information
covering the 4 months since the previous interview, although a few core items are mea-
sured only as of the interview date, once every 4 months. Topical questions produce
in-depth information on specic subjects and are not asked at every interview. Infor-
12SIPP has been collected and released for the years 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991,
1992, 1996 and 2001.
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mation on employer sponsored pension plans is typically asked in a topical module13,
and allows us to assign each worker a (mutually exclusive) pension participation sta-
tus: participating to a DB plan, participating to a DC plan, not participating into any
employer provided pension arrangement. However, further detailed characteristics of
the plans is not available in SIPP data.
Relying on data from the Employee Benet Surveys14, we assume that the typical
vesting schedule applied by DB plans before the TRA86 reform was a cli¤ 10 years
vesting, while the typical vesting schedule applied in DC plans was to give full vesting in
less than 5 years. Under this assumption, the reform a¤ected only workers participating
in a DB plan with 5 to 10 years of accrued years of service; these workers represent the
"treatment group".
For estimation purposes we use data extracts from the 1984, 1986, 1990, 1992 and
1996 SIPP panel years. The choice of these particular years is driven by the fact
that we need data on participation to employer provided pension arrangements (either
DB or DC) and voluntary job mobility coming from the pre-reform and post-reform
period. We analyze job mobility behavior during the year following the collection of
pension information15. Our dependent variable equals one if a worker changes job
13The pension topical module is asked in wave 4 during SIPP 1984 and SIPP 1986 and in wave 7
during SIPP 1996.
14See Graham (1988).
15Our observation periods thus span from wave four to wave seven for SIPP 1984, 1986, 1990 and
1992 and from wave seven to wave ten for SIPP 1996.
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without an intervening spell of unemployment during the twelve months following the
rst interview. Although the information necessary to di¤erentiate quits from layo¤s
is available in the SIPP data, it does not appear to be very reliable. As pointed out
by Gustman and Steinmeier (1993), several variables, such as the randomly assigned
job number or direct questions to employees, could be used to identify mobility in the
SIPP data. However, the mobility information derived from these variables is often
contradictory. Therefore, we rst adopt a broad denition of mobility, that denes a
transition to a new job to have occurred as long as one of those variables indicates a
job change. We then dene voluntary job mobility as a transition to a new employer
occurring over the observed period without an intervening spell of unemployment.
We restrict the sample to individuals in full time employment working in private
sector - non agricultural, non construction - rms in the last month of the reference
period. We exclude agricultural and construction workers due to the idiosyncratic
nature of job turnover in these sectors. In particular construction workers are unique in
both the highly seasonal nature of their work and the tendency for their pension plans
to be provided through unions in the form of multiemployer plans. The latter plans
eliminate most of the portability issues arising in single employer plans by considering
service with multiple employers under the same plan as if the individual had worked with
one employer the entire time. Thus construction workers usually combine high turnover
with little discontinuity of pension coverage. In the same fashion, public sector workers
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are excluded both because they have di¤erent patterns of turnover and because public
pension plans usually have more generous portability provisions. In order to focus our
analysis on a group that has a high attachment to the labor force, avoiding the sample
selection issues related to labor market young age entry and old age exit, we restrict our
analysis to 25 to 50 years-old individuals. Moreover, the empirical analysis is performed
separately for males and females because of their typically di¤erent turnover patterns.
We assess the robustness of our results estimating the model using di¤erent pooled
SIPP samples as well as di¤erent control groups. First, we use SIPP 1984 and 1986
as pre-reform data and SIPP 1990, 1992 and 1996 as post-reform data (Sample 1).
Second, in order to account for the progressive enactment of the reform, we consider
only SIPP 1996 as post reform period (Sample 2). Finally, we use only SIPP 1984 as
pre-reform period (Sample 3) to account for the fact that individuals observed in SIPP
1986, although not yet directly a¤ected by the TRA86 reform, could have changed
their behavior while expecting its enactment (1st January 1989). The control groups
used in the estimation are represented by individuals with 5 to 10 years of service not
participating to a DB plan (control group 1), individuals with 5 to 10 years of service
not participating to any employer provided pension arrangement (control group 2), and
nally by individuals participating to a DC employer sponsored pension plan (control
group 3).
Tables 1 and 2 presents the mean values of some relevant characteristics of the
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treatment and control groups respectively for males and females. There are relevant
di¤erences in job mobility rates, particularly between control group 2 and the treatment
group. These two groups seem to be di¤erent along other dimensions as well. Individ-
uals participating in a DB plan earn higher wages, are better educated, are more likely
to have employer provided health insurance, to be union members and to be in large
rms. The di¤erences are somewhat reduced but still relevant while extending the con-
trol group to individuals participating to DC plans (control group 1). As a consequence,
we can be concerned that estimates obtained including the rst two control groups are
inconsistent. Alternatively, when we restrict the control group to workers participating
in DC plans (control group 3) we notice its similarity with the treatment group over
the relevant observed characteristics.
Tables 3 and 4 present voluntary job mobility rates for the treatment group and
control groups by panel year. The gures emerging from these tables are displayed in
Figures 1 and 2. They provide a clear illustration of the similarity of the treatment
group and control group 3.
Tables 5 to 10 present voluntary job mobility rates for the treatment group and
control groups in the years before and after the reform, by gender and samples as well
as "di¤erence" and "di¤erence-in-di¤erence" estimates using a linear probability model.
In each table, column 1 and 2 correspond respectively to the average job mobility rate
pre and post TRA86; column 3 contains the di¤erence estimates of the change in job
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mobility by control group. The di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimates of the impact of the
reform on job mobility is provided in the fourth column. These preliminary gures
suggest that the voluntary job mobility rates of the treated increased after the TRA86.
Alternatively, the job mobility rates of the control groups experienced small increments
or decrements. The di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimates are usually found to be positive,
although never statistically signicant at standard levels.
5 Results
Because the treatment group and the control groups di¤er in demographic and job re-
lated characteristics, the observed di¤erences in job mobility outcomes may reect un-
derlying di¤erences between the treatment and control groups rather than a treatment
e¤ect. Controlling for demographic and job related characteristics in a di¤erence-in-
di¤erence approach is important if the composition of the treatment and the control
groups changes over time and some of these characteristics are correlated with the
dependent variable. In addition, controlling for demographic and job related char-
acteristics reduces the residual variance of the regression and produces more e¢cient
estimates.
We estimate the model under two specications. Under the rst specication, the
vector  in equation (3) contains personal and family related variables proxing for
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mobility costs16, job related variables 17, local labour market variables18 controlling for
cycle e¤ects as well as year dummies. Industry dummies - with manufacturing industry
as the reference group - and occupation dummies - with blue collar occupation as the
reference group - are included to proxy for industry and occupation specic turnover
rates faced by individuals. Moreover, we include an interaction term between the post-
reform period and the age variable to account for the fact that individuals with di¤erent
ages can be a¤ected in di¤erent way by macroeconomic trends.
Under the second specication, among the costs of mobility we include a variable
proxying for the opportunity cost of leaving a pension job (the pension loss), as well
as an interaction term between the post-reform period and the pension loss applicable
after the reform.
Table 11 to 16 present the results of estimating equation (3) separately for males
and female, using di¤erent control groups and di¤erent samples19. The results reported
in columns 1 and 2 have been obtained using the wider control group. Column 2
specication also controls for pension loss variables. Similarly, the results reported in
16Included are dummy variables for age, geographical area (SMSA as well as regions), marital status,
children, house ownership, race, employed spouse, and continuous variables for experience, experience
squared, education and family size.
17Included are dummy variables for pension plan participation, rm size, employer provided training
and health insurance, union status, industry and occupation, and continuous variables for log-hourly
wage and job tenure.
18State unemployment rates.
19The estimated coe¢cients for family size as well as the dummy variables controlling for marital
status, children under 18, housing tenure, industry, occupation and region of residence, are not repotted
in the tables. The estimated coe¢cients have been transformed into marginal e¤ects.  ¡  are
reported in parenthesis, while the coe¢cients statistical signicance is indicated with one (90%) or
two (95%) asterisks.
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columns 3 and 4 have been obtained using the restricted, but less comparable control
group, while those reported in columns 5 and 6 use the more comparable control group
3. In general, these results are quite comparable to those reported in Tables 5 to 10,
obtained through a linear probability model without other covariates. Also the results
are similar when using di¤erent control groups and sample sizes.
The estimated coe¢cients on  are small in magnitude and not statistical signif-
icant for females, suggesting that there is no overall trend in average job mobility for
the two groups. This is not the case for males, where the e¤ect is always positive and
statistically signicant, becoming stronger while using control group 3. The coe¢cient
on  has a negative sign, as expected, but is statistically signicant only for females
when using samples 1 and 2. Finally, the di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimate is generally
close to zero and always statistically not signicant. The results are also generally ro-
bust to the inclusion of pension loss variables pre and post reform. The coe¢cients on
the other control variables included in the regressions all have the expected signs.
These results seem to suggest that the vesting reform did not succeed in its main
objective of fostering the voluntary job mobility rate of workers tied to jobs by em-
ployer provided plans with long vesting periods. Moreover, the fact that the treatment
e¤ect, 3 changes very little when we include our vector of control variables suggests
that any changes in the composition of the treatment and control groups that occurred
over time are uncorrelated with the treatment.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper we exploit the natural experiment produced by the TRA86 vesting reform
to evaluate its e¤ects on voluntary job mobility behavior of the individuals a¤ected by
the reform - workers participating in a DB plan with 5 to 10 years of service. We use a
di¤erence-in-di¤erence identication strategy, comparing the pre-post reform change in
voluntary job mobility for workers treated by the reform with that of various groups of
workers with similar characteristics but not a¤ected by the reform and therefore taken
as control groups. Our main nding is that the reform had a not statistically signicant
e¤ect on the voluntary job mobility rate of the treated groups, both for males and for
females. Our ndings are robust to the use of di¤erent control groups and pre/post
reform samples. These results suggest that, while the reform reduced the pension loss
of workers participating in DB plans, it was ine¤ective in its main purpose of fostering
the voluntary job mobility rate of workers tied to jobs by employer provided plans
with long vesting periods.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (Means): Females
Treatment Group Control Group 1 Control Group 2 Control Group 3
Variable S.1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Job Mobility (%) 5.62 6.5 7 7.63 7.7 9.06 8.85 9.96 10.2 6.42 7.4 8
Hourly Wage 17.5 18.62 18.5 15.08 16.15 15.89 13.16 14.10 13.7 17 18.05 17.94
Employed Spouse (%) 35 35 35 28.3 27 26.7 22.25 21.85 21.1 34 32 32
House Owner (%) 76.4 75 75 70 69 68.6 64.62 62.38 48.6 75 75 75
DC Plan (%) 43.8 45 51.5 50 52 51.8
Pension Loss Pre Reform 112 111 110
Pension Loss Post Reform 54 33 43
Married (%) 77.2 77 77.8 71.8 77 73 68.6 69.57 69.4 75 76 76
Black (%) 10.2 10 10.2 12 10 14 13.68 14.38 16.5 10.2 11 11.7
Household Size 3.2 3.3 3.29 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.25 3.27 3.28 3.2 3.2 3.2
Children Under 18 (%) 60 55 61.7 57 57 57 54.18 54.9 54.6 59 59 59.3
Experience 15.4 15.6 15.9 15.7 16 16.6 16.14 16.39 17 15.4 15.7 16.2
Education 14.2 14 13.9 13.5 13.4 13.3 12.95 12.79 12.6 14.1 14 13.8
Employer Size: 100 (%) 5.7 73 69 42 52 49.4 29.37 34.44 32.7 54 67 65
Employer Training (%) 15.7 10 6.9 13.4 8.5 4.7 11.96 7.6 4.7 14.8 9 4.8
Emp. Health Insurance (%) 92 92 90.8 81 82 80 73.8 73.3 70.1 89 91 89
Union (%) 30 31 32.6 12 13 12.3 10 10.65 11.3 13.8 15 13.3
State Unempl. Rate (%) 6.27 5.7 5.67 6.2 5.6 5.5 6.35 5.78 5.7 6.05 5.5 5.3
Sample Size 1.815 998 771 2.985 1.508 1.159 1.447 723 559 1.448 785 600
Source: Our elaboration on SIPP data.
Table 2: Summary Statistics (Means): Females
Treatment Group Control Group 1 Control Group 2 Control Group 3
Variable S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3 S1 S2 S3
Job Mobility (%) 4.9 5.74 6.44 6.9 7.72 7.68 8.36 9.62 9.36 5.1 5.5 5.85
Hourly Wage 13.45 14.28 14.38 11.41 12.37 12.45 10.24 11.14 11 12.85 13.79 14
Employed Spouse (%) 41.5 41.29 41.8 34.3 34.77 33.2 30.7 31.2 27.9 38.78 38.9 38.9
House Owner (%) 73.9 74.46 74.7 69.3 68 67.5 66.36 64.4 63.8 73.04 72.13 71.5
DC Plan (%) 38 42.28 49.6 44.65 46.25 47.9
Pension Loss Pre Reform 110.7 111.8 110.7
Pension Loss Post Reform 54.3 35.5 46.2
Married (%) 66 66.44 67 62.9 62.68 61.9 62.6 61.66 59.3 63.24 63.86 64.7
Black (%) 15.2 15.44 17 16.09 16.7 18.7 17.37 18.58 22 14.5 14.55 15.1
Household Size 3.07 3.12 3.13 3.11 3.15 3.12 3.2 3.26 3.22 2.99 3.02 3.01
Children Under 18 (%) 54.1 54.45 53.9 56.1 57.15 56.1 57.9 59.55 56.8 54 54.36 55.3
Experience 16.67 16.88 17.26 17.25 17.6 17.9 17.74 18.15 18.6 16.64 17 17.24
Education 14.2 14.13 14.1 13.30 13.24 13.24 12.94 12.84 12.8 13.75 13.69 13.75
Employer Size: 100 (%) 55.17 69.6 67.4 41.83 51.9 51.4 32.3 39.92 39.3 53.68 65.85 64.53
Employer Training (%) 14.48 9.1 6.83 11.39 6.94 4.43 9.54 6.46 3.47 13.68 7.5 5.47
Emp. Health Insurance (%) 78.17 79.1 76 66.45 66.64 65.4 57.75 57.58 56 77.25 77.18 75.7
Union (%) 25.72 26.34 26.68 9.54 10.2 10.3 8.43 9.09 9.53 10.93 11.49 11.1
State Unempl. Rate (%) 6.18 5.63 5.5 6.16 5.54 5.4 6.25 5.64 5.52 6.05 5.43 5.25
Sample Size 1.878 1.010 776 2.766 1.412 1.107 1.531 759 776 1.235 653 530
Source: Our elaboration on SIPP data.
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Table 3: Job Mobility Rate. Males
SIPP Panel: 1984 1986 1990 1992 1996
Treatment Group 5.93 4.85 3.67 5.18 7.83
Control Group 1 8.09 7.16 6.02 7.11 9.59
Control Group 2 8.04 9.15 6.83 8.66 11.64
Control Group 3 8.15 5.41 5.12 5.44 7.93
Sample Size 745 576 1.052 1.152 1.185
Source: Our elaboration on SIPP data.
Table 4: Job Mobility Rate. Females
SIPP Panel: 1984 1986 1990 1992 1996
Treatment Group 5.41 3.42 2.79 4.85 7.83
Control Group 1 7.10 7.87 4.59 7.61 7.95
Control Group 2 8.25 10.44 4.88 9.67 9.97
Control Group 3 5.48 4.07 4.18 5.08 7.93
Sample Size 648 539 1.091 1.131 1.235
Source: Our elaboration on SIPP data.
Table 5: Di¤erence in Di¤erence Estimate of Voluntary Job Mobility. Males. Sample 1
Pre TRA86 Post TRA86 D D-D
Treatment Group (%) 5.496 5.675 0.179
[564] [1.251] (0.15)
Control Group 1 (%) 7.662 7.624 -0.038 0.217
[757] [2.138] (0.03) (0.13)
Control Group 2 (%) 8.51 8.97 0.46 -0.281
[388] [1.059] (0.28) (0.14)
Control Group 3 (%) 6.775 6.3 -0.473 0.652
[369] [1.079] (0.32) (0.35)
Source: Our elaboration on SIPP data.
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Table 6: Di¤erence in Di¤erence Estimate of Voluntary Job Mobility. Males. Sample 2
Pre TRA86 Post TRA86 D D-D
Treatment Group (%) 5.496 7.834 2.338
[564] [434] (1.48)
Control Group 1 (%) 7.662 9.587 1.925 0.413
[757] [751] (1.33) (0.19)
Control Group 2 (%) 8.51 11.64 3.13 -0.808
[388] [335] (1.40) (0.30)
Control Group 3 (%) 6.775 7.933 1.158 1.18
[369] [416] (0.62) (0.49)
Source: Our elaboration on SIPP data.
Table 7: Di¤erence in Di¤erence Estimate of Voluntary Job Mobility. Males. Sample 3
Pre TRA86 Post TRA86 D D-D
Treatment Group (%) 5.93 7.83 1.9
[337] [434] (1.03)
Control Group 1 (%) 8.09 9.59 1.5 0.4
[408] [751] (0.85) (0.15)
Control Group 2 (%) 8.04 11.64 3.6 -1.7
[224] [335] (1.38) (0.55)
Control Group 3 (%) 8.15 7.93 -0.22 2.12
[184] [416] (0.09) (0.70)
Source: Our elaboration on SIPP data.
Table 8: Di¤erence in Di¤erence Estimate of Voluntary Job Mobility. Females. Sample 1
Pre TRA86 Post TRA86 D D-D
Treatment Group (%) 4.528 5.044 0.516
[530] [1.348] (0.47)
Control Group 1 (%) 7.458 6.733 -.725 1.241
[657] [2.109] (0.64) (0.76)
Control Group 2 (%) 9.28 8.05 -.725 1.243
[388] [1.143] (0.64) (0.76)
Control Group 3 (%) 4.832 5.176 .344 .172
[269] [966] (0.23) (0.09)
Source: Our elaboration on SIPP data.
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Table 9: Di¤erence in Di¤erence Estimate of Voluntary Job Mobility. Females. Sample 2
Pre TRA86 Post TRA86 D D-D
Treatment Group (%) 4.528 7.083 2.555
[530] [480] (1.74)*
Control Group 1 (%) 7.458 7.947 0.489 2.066
[657] [755] (0.34) (0.99)
Control Group 2 (%) 9.28 9.97 0.69 1.865
[388] [371] (0.32) (0.74)
Control Group 3 (%) 4.832 5.989 1.157 1.398
[269] [384] (0.64) (0.60)
Source: Our elaboration on SIPP data.
Table 10: Di¤erence in Di¤erence Estimate of Voluntary Job Mobility. Females. Sample 3
Pre TRA86 Post TRA86 D D-D
Treatment Group (%) 5.41 7.08 1.67
[296] [480] (0.92)
Control Group 1 (%) 7.10 7.95 0.85 0.82
[206] [755] (0.49) (0.33)
Control Group 2 (%) 8.25 9.97 1.72 -.05
[352] [371] (0.68) (0.01)
Control Group 3 (%) 5.48 5.99 0.51 1.16
[146] [384] (0.22) (0.40)
Source: Our elaboration on SIPP data.
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Table 11: Probit Job Mobility Equation. Sample 1. Males
Control Group 1 Control Group 2 Control Group 3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Post Reform*DB Plan 0.003 0.030 0.001 0.029 0.005 -0.001
(0.19) (0.59) (0.03) (0.55) (0.30) (0.02)
DB Plan -0.016 -0.056 -0.014 -0.098 -0.006 0.000
(1.15) (1.33) (0.86) (1.80) (0.42) (0.01)
Post Reform 0.032 0.031 0.040 0.038 0.046 0.046
(1.75)* (1.68)* (1.78)* (1.70)* (2.17)** (2.17)**
Age 25-40 0.029 0.028 0.019 0.019 0.056 0.056
(1.50) (1.45) (0.81) (0.79) (2.74)** (2.73)**
Post Reform*Age 25-40 -0.020 -0.018 -0.029 -0.026 -0.041 -0.042
(1.07) (0.95) (1.27) (1.11) (1.82) (1.80)
Black -0.009 -0.009 -0.015 -0.015 0.002 0.001
(0.82) (0.81) (1.20) (1.21) (0.12) (0.12)
Education 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008
(3.93)** (3.84)** (3.09)** (2.95)** (3.44)** (3.44)**
Experience -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.61) (0.67) (1.17) (1.31) (0.72) (0.72)
Experience Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.79) (0.79) (0.86) (0.91) (1.51) (1.51)
Log Hourly Wage -0.036 -0.036 -0.037 -0.038 -0.035 -0.035
(4.59)** (4.59)** (3.95)** (3.96)** (3.87)** (3.88)**
Job Tenure -0.009 -0.011 -0.011 -0.015 -0.006 -0.005
(3.62)** (3.39)** (3.47)** (3.45)** (2.00)** (1.34)
Employer Size: 100 0.008 0.007 0.015 0.015 0.004 0.004
(0.93) (0.91) (1.54) (1.49) (0.44) (0.44)
Employer Training 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.005 -0.001 -0.001
(0.55) (0.57) (0.32) (0.37) (0.13) (0.13)
Employer Health Insurance -0.026 -0.026 -0.032 -0.032 -0.030 -0.030
(2.42)** (2.40)** (2.60)** (2.56)** (2.08)** (2.08)**
DC Plan -0.013 -0.012
(1.45) (1.39)
Union Member -0.020 -0.020 -0.024 -0.025 -0.023 -0.023
(2.02)** (2.06)** (2.14)** (2.22)** (2.25)** (2.24)**
State Unemployment Rate -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(1.20) (1.21) (0.64) (0.67) (0.24) (0.24)
SMSA 0.016 0.016 0.009 0.009 0.017 0.017
(2.25)** (2.25)** (1.09) (1.08) (2.11)** (2.11)**
Year 84 0.015 0.015 0.007 0.008 0.020 0.020
(1.02) (1.05) (0.42) (0.46) (1.16) (1.15)
Year 90 -0.031 -0.031 -0.035 -0.035 -0.030 -0.030
(2.90)** (2.90)** (2.80)** (2.79)** (2.55)** (2.55)**
Year 92 -0.019 -0.019 -0.017 -0.017 -0.023 -0.023
(1.66) (1.67) (1.23) (1.23) (1.76) (1.76)
Pension Loss 0.041 0.071 -0.006
(1.02) (1.62) (0.14)
Post Reform*Post Reform Pension Loss -0.033 -0.036 0.008
(0.56) (0.59) (0.14)
Log Likelihood 1.117 1.116.7 779 777.6 699.9 699.9
Observed P 6.86 6.86 7.05 7.05 5.98 5.98
Predicted P(X¯) 5.93 5.93 5.86 5.85 5.1 5.1
Sample Size 4.710 4.710 3.262 3.262 3.263 3.26329
Table 12: Probit Job Mobility Equation. Sample 1. Females
Control Group 1 Control Group 2 Control Group 3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Post Reform*DB Pension 0.010 0.018 0.012 0.023 0.005 -0.007
(0.64) (0.39) (0.68) (0.47) (0.30) (0.16)
DB Plan -0.032 -0.086 -0.038 -0.099 -0.002 -0.064
(2.41)** (2.16)** (2.37)** (1.84)* (0.16) (1.27)
Post Reform -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.002 -0.001
(0.46) (0.46) (0.29) (0.30) (0.08) (0.04)
Age 25-40 -0.039 -0.037 -0.050 -0.049 -0.039 -0.034
(1.99)** (1.91)* (2.18)** (2.12)** (1.71)* (1.53)
Post Reform*Age25-40 0.033 0.033 0.034 0.034 0.040 0.037
(2.02)** (1.99)** (1.77)** (1.76)* (2.17)** (2.00)**
Black -0.013 -0.013 -0.011 -0.011 -0.010 -0.010
(1.44) (1.44) (1.05) (1.06) (1.02) (1.00)
Education 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003
(1.47) (1.43) (0.84) (0.80) (1.13) (1.12)
Experience 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.002
(1.42) (1.39) (2.10)** (2.06)** (0.70) (0.70)
Experience Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(2.09)* (2.09)* (2.84)** (2.84)** (0.97) (0.95)
Log Hourly Wage -0.011 -0.012 -0.019 -0.020 -0.008 -0.008
(1.43) (1.51) (2.03)** (2.10)** (0.85) (0.89)
Job Tenure -0.004 -0.007 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.008
(1.58) (2.29)** (0.75) (1.39) (0.87) (1.95)*
Employer Size: 100 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 -0.008
(0.60) (0.60) (0.60) (0.61) (0.97) (0.95)
Employer Training 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.009
(0.58) (0.56) (0.53) (0.51) (0.82) (0.79)
Employer Health Insurance -0.012 -0.012 -0.008 -0.008 -0.029 -0.029
(1.41) (1.43) (0.80) (0.81) (2.61)** (2.63)**
DC Plan -0.024 -0.024
(3.02)** (2.93)**
Union Member -0.026 -0.026 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025
(2.68)** (2.73)** (2.22)** (2.26)** (2.55)** (2.58)**
State Unemployment Rate -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
(0.39) (0.42) (0.31) (0.34) (0.05) (0.08)
SMSA 0.016 0.016 0.010 0.010 0.017 0.016
(2.34)** (2.33)** (1.20) (1.20) (2.15)** (2.12)**
Year 84 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.011 0.022 0.021
(0.67) (0.69) (0.64) (0.66) (1.25) (1.22)
Year 90 -0.037 -0.036 -0.043 -0.043 -0.029 -0.028
(3.68)** (3.64)** (3.72)** (3.69)** (2.67)** (2.61)**
Year 92 -0.015 -0.015 -0.018 -0.017 -0.021 -0.020
(1.41) (1.39) (1.38) (1.36) (1.76) (1.75)
Pension Loss 0.056 0.049 0.050
(1.49) (1.17) (1.31)
Post Reform*Post Pension Loss -0.009 -0.013 0.016
(0.16) (0.23) (0.32)
Log Likelihood 1.015.8 1.014.3 773.1 772.2 588.3 586.6
Observed P 6.09 6.09 6.45 6.45 4.98 4.98
Predicted P(X) 5.26 5.24 5.5 5.46 4.26 4.22
Sample Size 4.644 4.644 3.409 3.409 3.113 3.11330
Table 13: Probit Job Mobility Equation. Sample 2. Males
Control Group 1 Control Group 2 Control Group 3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Post Reform*DB Plan 0.008 -0.009 -0.001 -0.017 0.012 -0.032
(0.39) (0.13) (0.04) (0.24) (0.53) (0.55)
DB Plan -0.017 -0.058 -0.016 -0.083 -0.008 -0.027
(1.02) (1.03) (0.87) (1.14) (0.51) (0.43)
Post Reform 0.041 0.041 0.055 0.056 0.063 0.066
(1.62) (1.63) (1.71)* (1.72)* (2.06)** (2.14)**
Age 25-40 0.021 0.022 0.016 0.019 0.044 0.046
(0.85) (0.89) (0.55) (0.63) (1.62) (1.71)
Post Reform*Age 25-40 -0.022 -0.023 -0.024 -0.026 -0.051 -0.054
(0.96) (0.98) (0.88) (0.93) (2.11)** (2.22)**
Black -0.005 -0.005 -0.010 -0.010 0.007 0.007
(0.32) (0.34) (0.55) (0.57) (0.38) (0.36)
Education 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.006
(2.81)** (2.77)** (2.43)* (2.36)* (1.78)* (1.82)*
Experience -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.38) (0.44) (0.38) (0.46) (0.81) (0.86)
Experience Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.31) (0.36) (0.15) (0.23) (0.93) (1.02)
Log Hourly Wage -0.036 -0.036 -0.026 -0.025 -0.040 -0.040
(3.09)** (3.09)** (1.82)* (1.78)* (3.05)** (3.06)**
Job Tenure -0.011 -0.014 -0.009 -0.015 -0.008 -0.011
(2.82)** (2.88)** (2.02)** (2.23)** (1.95)* (1.89)*
Employer Size 0.003 0.003 0.016 0.016 0.000 0.000
(0.25) (0.23) (1.16) (1.15) (0.01) (0.02)
Employer Training 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.006 -0.009 -0.010
(0.11) (0.10) (0.27) (0.28) (0.46) (0.49)
Employer Health Insurance -0.013 -0.013 -0.024 -0.023 -0.010 -0.010
(0.79) (0.79) (1.30) (1.27) (0.46) (0.50)
DC Plan -0.012 -0.011
(0.88) (0.81)
Union Member -0.023 -0.023 -0.033 -0.033 -0.025 -0.025
(1.65)* (1.67)* (2.05)** (2.09)** (1.75)* (1.76)*
State Unemployment Rate -0.002 -0.003 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.003
(0.61) (0.64) (0.12) (0.07) (0.62) (0.60)
SMSA 0.028 0.028 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024
(2.63)** (2.65)** (1.92)* (1.92)* (2.00)** (2.04)**
Year 84 0.011 0.011 0.004 0.004 0.017 0.016
(0.65) (0.64) (0.22) (0.21) (0.91) (0.85)
Pension Loss 0.042 0.058 0.017
(0.78) (0.95) (0.31)
Post Reform* Post Pension Loss 0.022 0.021 0.063
(0.26) (0.24) (0.77)
Log Likelihood 653.4 652.8 447.8 447.1 423.2 322.7
Observed P 7.78 7.78 7.96 7.96 6.9 6.9
Predicted P(X) 6.88 6.88 6.65 6.65 5.9 5.9
Sample Size 2.506 2.506 1.721 1.721 1.783 1.783
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Table 14: Probit Job Mobility Equation. Sample 2. Females
Control Group 1 Control Group 2 Control Group 3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Post Reform*DB Plan 0.026 0.057 0.031 0.038 0.017 0.054
(1.19) (0.76) (1.26) (0.52) (0.72) (0.79)
DB Plan -0.036 -0.072 -0.044 -0.076 -0.002 -0.046
(2.30)** (1.36) (2.42)** (1.11) (0.11) (0.74)
Post Reform -0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.002 -0.007 -0.009
(0.14) (0.17) (0.10) (0.10) (0.27) (0.35)
Age 25-40 -0.028 -0.028 -0.039 -0.039 -0.029 -0.029
(1.16) (1.16) (1.39) (1.36) (1.05) (1.07)
Post Reform*Age 25-40 0.030 0.032 0.019 0.020 0.049 0.053
(1.37) (1.41) (0.78) (0.77) (1.92) (2.00)*
Black -0.009 -0.009 0.001 0.001 -0.012 -0.012
(0.69) (0.69) (0.04) (0.04) (0.85) (0.85)
Education 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002
(1.42) (1.38) (1.07) (1.04) (0.70) (0.63)
Experience 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.001 0.001
(1.02) (0.99) (1.84)* (1.83)* (0.24) (0.23)
Experience Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.21) (1.22) (2.12)** (2.12)** (0.32) (0.37)
Log Hourly Wage -0.017 -0.017 -0.029 -0.029 -0.018 -0.018
(1.46) (1.47) (2.10)** (2.12)** (1.39) (1.41)
Job Tenure -0.003 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 -0.003
(0.86) (1.02) (0.81) (0.90) (0.33) (0.58)
Employer Size -0.013 -0.013 -0.012 -0.012 -0.022 -0.022
(1.20) (1.21) (0.93) (0.93) (1.84) (1.85)
Employer Training 0.022 0.022 0.028 0.028 0.002 0.002
(1.10) (1.10) (1.22) (1.20) (0.11) (0.12)
Employer Health Insurance -0.002 -0.003 0.009 0.008 -0.038 -0.039
(0.20) (0.22) (0.60) (0.59) (2.36)** (2.41)**
DC Plan -0.027 -0.027
(2.21)** (2.19)**
Union Member -0.029 -0.029 -0.025 -0.026 -0.023 -0.023
(2.08)** (2.09)** (1.59) (1.60) (1.70)* (1.71)*
State Unemployment Rate 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001
(0.30) (0.28) (0.54) (0.53) (0.37) (0.34)
SMSA 0.019 0.019 0.014 0.013 0.019 0.019
(1.86)* (1.85)* (1.13) (1.12) (1.76)* (1.76)*
Year 84 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.017 0.017
(0.56) (0.58) (0.52) (0.52) (0.92) (0.95)
Pension Loss 0.036 0.026 0.037
(0.73) (0.46) (0.73)
Post Reform*Post Pension loss -0.031 -0.007 -0.040
(0.40) (0.09) (0.56)
Log Likelihood 580.2 580.2 438.8 438.7 342.4 342.1
Observed P 6.9 6.9 7.4 7.4 5.65 5.65
Predicted P(X) 6.06 6.05 6.2 6.2 4.76 4.75
Observations 2.422 2.422 1.769 1.769 1.663 1.663
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Table 15: Probit Job Mobility Equation. Sample 3. Males
Control Group 1 Control Group 2 Control Group 3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 2 Model 2
Post Reform*DB Plan 0.011 0.007 -0.005 -0.015 0.017 -0.017
(0.40) (0.09) (0.17) (0.20) (0.61) (0.25)
DB Plan -0.015 -0.062 -0.008 -0.113 -0.016 -0.011
(0.66) (0.92) (0.31) (1.28) (0.73) (0.15)
Post Reform 0.053 0.053 0.063 0.065 0.113 0.116
(1.69)* (1.68)* (1.72)* (1.76)* (2.44)** (2.48)**
Age 25-40 0.036 0.037 0.027 0.030 0.097 0.099
(1.12) (1.14) (0.72) (0.82) (2.36)** (2.39)**
Post Reform*Age 25-40 -0.036 -0.035 -0.025 -0.027 -0.118 -0.121
(1.18) (1.15) (0.72) (0.75) (2.65)** (2.69)**
Black 0.004 0.004 -0.001 -0.001 0.020 0.020
(0.22) (0.21) (0.05) (0.06) (0.97) (0.96)
Education 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.011 0.006 0.006
(2.79)** (2.74)** (2.77)** (2.67)** (1.56) (1.60)
Experience 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004
(0.05) (0.11) (0.03) (0.14) (0.78) (0.81)
Experience Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.03) (0.08) (0.01) (0.10) (0.87) (0.94)
Log Hourly Wage -0.039 -0.039 -0.021 -0.020 -0.045 -0.045
(2.87)** (2.86)** (1.33) (1.25) (3.11)** (3.12)**
Job Tenure -0.010 -0.013 -0.011 -0.020 -0.005 -0.007
(2.26)** (2.35)** (2.11)** (2.49)** (1.14) (0.97)
Employer Size 0.005 0.005 0.012 0.012 0.009 0.009
(0.37) (0.36) (0.78) (0.78) (0.67) (0.65)
Employer Training 0.051 0.051 0.063 0.064 0.033 0.032
(1.76)* (1.75)* (1.83)* (1.85)* (1.08) (1.06)
Employer Health Insurance -0.027 -0.027 -0.040 -0.040 -0.018 -0.018
(1.46) (1.46) (1.92)* (1.90)* (0.79) (0.81)
DC Plan -0.005 -0.004
(0.32) (0.25)
Union Member -0.021 -0.021 -0.026 -0.027 -0.024 -0.024
(1.28) (1.29) (1.40) (1.45) (1.50) (1.51)
State Unemployment Rate 0.002 0.002 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.003
(0.40) (0.39) (0.76) (0.74) (0.53) (0.56)
SMSA 0.30 0.3 0.21 0.21 0.27 0.26
(2.39)** (2.39)** (1.43) (1.41) (1.93)* (1.94)*
Pension Loss 0.050 0.092 -0.005
(0.76) (1.26) (0.07)
Post Reform* Post Pension Loss 0.002 0.010 0.045
(0.02) (0.10) (0.50)
Log Likelihood 520 519.5 355.63 355.48 336.2 336.04
Observed P 8.23 8.23 8.35 8.35 7.44 7.44
Predicted P(X) 7.2 7.2 6.9 6.9 5.9 5.89
Sample Size 1.930 1.930 1.330 1.330 1.371 1.371
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Table 16: Probit Job Mobility Equation. Sample 3. Females
Control Group 1 Control Group 2 Control Group 3
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Post Reform*DB Plan 0.011 0.014 0.010 -0.017 0.015 0.017
(0.41) (0.19) (0.35) (0.23) (0.53) (0.24)
DB Plan -0.016 -0.033 -0.020 0.007 0.001 -0.033
(0.75) (0.52) (0.80) (0.09) (0.03) (0.45)
Post Reform -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.006 -0.019 -0.018
(0.23) (0.22) (0.21) (0.17) (0.54) (0.52)
Age 25-40 -0.014 -0.013 -0.034 -0.032 -0.016 -0.016
(0.44) (0.43) (0.92) (0.86) (0.47) (0.45)
Post Reform* Age 25-40 0.017 0.017 0.022 0.019 0.033 0.034
(0.62) (0.61) (0.69) (0.57) (1.11) (1.09)
Black -0.012 -0.012 0.001 0.001 -0.013 -0.013
(0.78) (0.78) (0.03) (0.04) (0.80) (0.78)
Education 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.000 0.000
(0.81) (0.80) (0.88) (0.92) (0.01) (0.02)
Experience 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.009 0.001 0.001
(1.11) (1.10) (1.84)* (1.87)* (0.14) (0.14)
Experience Squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(1.26) (1.25) (1.97)** (1.96)** (0.26) (0.28)
Log Hourly Wage -0.021 -0.021 -0.036 -0.036 -0.018 -0.019
(1.56) (1.58) (2.25)** (2.24)** (1.19) (1.22)
Job Tenure -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.007
(0.92) (0.91) (0.63) (0.35) (0.84) (0.95)
Employer Size: 100 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.028 -0.028
(1.56) (1.55) (1.27) (1.28) (2.00)** (1.98)**
Employer TRaining -0.012 -0.012 -0.009 -0.010 -0.026 -0.026
(0.48) (0.49) (0.29) (0.32) (1.07) (1.08)
Employer Health Insurance -0.010 -0.010 0.004 0.004 -0.046 -0.046
(0.70) (0.71) (0.24) (0.25) (2.49)** (2.51)**
DC Plan -0.020 -0.020
(1.34) (1.33)
Union Member -0.028 -0.028 -0.021 -0.021 -0.022 -0.022
(1.74)* (1.75)* (1.13) (1.11) (1.35) (1.37)
State Unemployment Rate -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.19) (0.19) (0.06) (0.07) (0.15) (0.15)
SMSA 0.014 0.014 0.006 0.006 0.015 0.015
(1.14) (1.14) (0.41) (0.40) (1.14) (1.13)
Pension Loss 0.017 -0.025 0.031
(0.29) (0.36) (0.49)
Post Reform*Post Pension Loss -0.005 0.039 -0.004
(0.05) (0.40) (0.05)
Log Likelihood 465.5 465.45 347.9 347.85 286.6 286.46
Observed P 7.17 7.17 7.69 7.69 6.2 6.2
Predicted P(X) 6.36 6.36 6.64 6.64 5.22 5.21
Sample Size 1.883 1.883 1.353 1.353 1.306 1.306
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